How do Central Banks react to wealth composition and asset prices? by Castro, Vítor & Sousa, Ricardo M.
                             
“How Do Central Banks React to Wealth Composition 
and Asset Prices?” 
 
 
Vítor Castro 
Ricardo M. Sousa 
 
 
NIPE WP 26/ 2010 
“How Do Central Banks React to Wealth Composition 
and Asset Prices?” 
 
 
 
 
Vítor Castro 
Ricardo M. Sousa 
 
   
 
 
 
 
        NIPE* WP 26/ 2010 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
URL: 
http://www.eeg.uminho.pt/economia/nipe 
                                                 
* NIPE – Núcleo de Investigação em Políticas Económicas – is supported by the Portuguese Foundation for 
Science and Technology through the Programa Operacional Ciência, Teconologia e Inovação (POCI 2010) of the 
Quadro Comunitário de Apoio III, which is financed by FEDER and Portuguese funds. 
How Do Central Banks React to
Wealth Composition and Asset Prices?
Vitor Castro
University of Coimbra and NIPE
Ricardo M. Sousay
University of Minho, NIPE, London School of Economics and FMG
Abstract
We assess the response of monetary policy to developments in asset markets in the Euro
Area, the US and the UK. We estimate the reaction of monetary policy to wealth composition
and asset prices using: (i) a linear framework based on a fully simultaneous system approach
in a Bayesian environment; and (ii) a nonlinear specication that relies on a smooth transition
regression model.
The linear framework suggests that wealth composition is indeed important in the formu-
lation of monetary policy. However, the attempts of central banks to mitigate undesirable
uctuations in say, nancial wealth, may disrupt housing wealth. A similar result can be found
when we assess the reaction of monetary authority to asset prices, although concerns about
"price" e¤ects are smaller.
The nonlinear model conrms these ndings. However, the concerns over wealth and its
components are stronger once ination is under control, i.e. below a certain target. Some
disruptions between nancial and housing wealth e¤ects are still present. They can also be
found in the reaction to asset prices, despite being less intense.
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"We mustnt allow the nancial system to collapse as it did in the 1930s... The nancial system
has gone overboard and the nancial engineering has grown to big, it takes up too big a share in the
worlds resources... Now it is shrinking. When it becomes regulated it will be less protable than
the last 25 years.
- George Soros, BBC Newsnight, 17 September 2008
1 Introduction
The severity of the 2008-2009 nancial turmoil has revealed the strength of the linkages between
the nancial markets and the banking system, the housing sector, the credit market, and the
monetary framework. Moreover, its dramatic economic damages and potentially long-lasting e¤ects
emerged as key elements for evaluating the impact that external imbalances, oil prices, private
investment, stock and credit markets or even duration dependence has on the likelihood of "boom-
bust" episodes and expansion and contraction ending (Agnello and Nerlich, 2010; Castro, 2010a).
Not surprisingly, a quick response and targeted conduction of monetary policy became crucial for
the attempt of promoting economic recovery.
Similarly, the relationship between policy instruments, macroeconomic variables, and wealth
has received a renewed interest in terms of research agenda (Sousa, 2010a). In fact, those uncon-
ventional interventions may negatively a¤ect the nexus between monetary stability and nancial
stability (Castro, 2010b; Granville and Mallick, 2009; Sousa, 2010b) and lead to business cycle
de-synchronization (Raq and Mallick, 2008; Mallick and Mohsin, 2007, 2010). In addition, they
represent a major test to the long-term (un)sustainability of public accounts as the evidence on
current developments in government bond markets shows (Hallett, 2008; Hallett and Lewis, 2008).
The dynamics of wealth composition and asset prices is undeniably of great importance for
nancial institutions and homeowners. Monetary authorities and policy makers also pay a close
attention those developments (Agnello and Schuknecht, 2009). However, our knowledge about the
reaction of monetary authorities to asset markets is still incomplete. In this context, the monetary
policy rule reaction function is fundamental. First, it provides the basis for forecasting changes in
the conduct of monetary policy and the e¤ects of economic shocks in the context of macroeconomic
modelling. Second, it allows one to understand what the major considerations underlying a central
banks behavior are in the outcome of a wide set of economic developments.
More importantly, despite the analysis of the macroeconomic e¤ects of monetary policy and
the importance of asset markets over the business cycle, there is still an important gap in the
literature, in particular, regarding the empirical relationship between monetary policy actions and
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wealth developments. How does the monetary authority adjust to the dynamics of wealth? How
does the central bank react to asset prices? Does monetary policy respond to wealth composition
and to asset price composition in the same manner? These are important questions that we try to
address in the current paper.
Using quarterly data for the Euro Area, the US and the UK, we compare the formulation
of monetary policy in the context of "quantity" e¤ects (that is, the response of the monetary
authority to nancial and housing wealth) and "price" e¤ects (i.e., the reaction of the central bank
to stock and housing prices). Specically, we estimate the monetary policy reaction function using
a fully simultaneous system approach in a Bayesian framework, therefore, allowing for simultaneity
between the monetary aggregate and the interest rate. We pay close attention to the monetary
policy rule and focus on the empirical evidence linking monetary policy and asset markets.
Next, we assess the existence of nonlinearity in the monetary policy rule using a smooth tran-
sition regression (STR) model. The traditional models derive monetary policy rules from the
minimization of a symmetric quadratic central banks loss function and assume that the aggregate
supply function is linear. However, in reality, this may not be the case and central banks can have
asymmetric preferences - i.e. they might assign di¤erent weights to negative and positive gaps in
ination, output or even in monetary variables included in their loss function. This gives rise to the
existence of a nonlinear monetary policy reaction function (Petersen, 2007, Surico, 2007a, 2007b).
Thus, we extend the analysis in this eld by applying a nonlinear smooth transition regression
to the study of the European Central Bank (ECB), the Federal Reserve Board (Fed), and the
Bank of England (BoE) policy reaction to wealth and asset prices, therefore, directly accounting
for the presence of asymmetries in the structure of the model. This procedure allows us to clarify
the importance of nonlinearity and whether the monetary policy is conducted di¤erently towards
wealth composition and asset prices when ination is above or below (inside or outside) a certain
target (range).
The results from the linear framework suggest that all central banks keep a vigilant posture
regarding developments in aggregate wealth. In particular, an increase in aggregate wealth leads
to a rise in the interest rate and the coe¢ cient associated to aggregate wealth in the policy rule is,
generally, large.
The empirical ndings also show that wealth composition is relevant for the formulation of
monetary policy. Specically, while the ECB and the Fed seem to pay a special attention to the
dynamics of nancial wealth, the BoE tends to be more focused on the developments of housing
wealth. Interestingly, the estimated reaction functions for the Euro Area and the US suggest that
monetary policy is tightened when nancial wealth rises, while it is relaxed in the outcome of
an expansion in housing wealth. In contrast, in the UK, the monetary authority counteracts the
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changes in housing wealth, while potentially allowing an amplication of the dynamics of nancial
wealth. This duality is extraordinary and it highlights that the attempts of the central bank
to mitigate unfavorable shocks in one component of wealth may have a disruptive e¤ect in the
other wealth component. As a result, tackling the developments in wealth composition may be
a complicated task for monetary policy, that is, providing a unique answer to both nancial and
housing wealth may be hard to achieve from a monetary perspective.
When assessing how central banks react to asset prices, the empirical ndings provide a similar
picture regarding the importance of the asset composition. Nevertheless, our results suggest that
"price" e¤ects are not particularly relevant. In fact, the estimated policy rules show that the
coe¢ cients associated with asset prices are substantially smaller than the ones linked with wealth
components.
The empirical ndings give support to the idea that both the ECB and the Fed strongly respond
to the dynamics in money markets. In fact, an increase in the relevant monetary aggregate leads to
a strong rise in the interest rate, reecting the concerns of monetary authorities regarding medium
to long-term price stability. As for the BoE, there seems to be an "hybrid" approach that places
an important weight in both the monetary aggregate and the interest rate dynamics in the policy
conduction.
The results of the estimation of the nonlinear smooth transition regression model show that the
ECB seems to put more attention to ination than to wealth (or to developments in its components),
especially, when ination is high. This may indicate a higher concern with ination than with wealth
per se. In fact, only when ination is under control, we nd a positive reaction of the interest rate
to nancial wealth. Similar evidence is found for the BoE: as soon as the BoE is able to keep
ination at a "low" level, the reaction to wealth becomes stronger. In that case, the inationary
pressures that may arise from increases in the aggregate wealth (or its nancial component) are
fought with a rise in the interest rate. On the contrary, the Fed is always tracking the dynamics of
nancial and housing wealth - especially, since the eighties - no matter what the ination state is.
In what concerns the reaction of central banks to asset prices, the empirical ndings conrm
the role played by asset composition. The monetary authorities seem to adjust their behavior in
response to stock prices (in particular, in the case of the Fed and the BoE), but their reaction to
housing prices is, somewhat, relaxed when ination is "low". On the other hand, the ECB seems to
actively reacts to housing prices, but only when ination is "high". However, a greater allocation
of attention is given towards ination, in particular, when it surpasses its target. Therefore, asset
prices seem to have a secondary relevance in the policy rule. Summing up, these ndings conrm
the conclusions provided by the linear framework that central banksconcerns over asset prices are,
generally, limited and it is di¢ cult to simultaneously stabilize stock and housing prices.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the
monetary policy rule. Section 3 presents the estimation methodologies. Section 4 discusses the
evidence on the reaction of monetary policy to wealth composition, while Section 5 analyzes the
results on the adjustment of policy conduction to asset price developments. Finally, Section 6
concludes with the main ndings and policy implications.
2 Review of the Literature
Since the seminal work by Taylor (1993), that assumes that central banks take into account
ination and output gap to set up the interest rate, several studies have developed di¤erent versions
of the reaction function. Some include a lagged interest rate term and justify the decision on
optimal monetary policy inertia or interest rate smoothing behavior (Woodford, 1999) or simply a
misspecication that fails to take into account the existence of correlation among di¤erent shocks
(Rudebusch, 2002). Other works incorporated features of forward-looking behavior in the policy
rule and emphasized the importance of ination targeting (Clarida et al., 1998) or real-time data
in the information set of the monetary authority (Orphanides, 2001).
Over the last years, some extensions have been made to this simple linear rule. In particular,
Clarida et al. (1998) suggest the use of a forward-looking version of the this rule where central
banks target expected ination and output gap instead of past or current values of these variables.
Other authors extend this linear rule by considering the e¤ect of other variables in the conduction
of monetary policy, a point that we intend to explore further in this paper. Chadha et al. (2004)
presents some evidence of central banksreaction to the exchange rate deviations from its average.
Considering the role of money supply in the ECB reaction function, Surico (2007b) argues that it
does not a¤ect the ECBs behaviour directly but it is a good instrument to predict future ination.
The role of asset prices is also an important issue considered in other studies. However, no consensus
was reached about whether the central bank should or should not target this kind of variables.
Cecchetti et al. (2000) and Chadha et al. (2004) consider it important that central banks target
asset prices and provide strong support and evidence in that direction. On the contrary, Bernanke
and Gertler (2001) and Bullard and Schaling (2002) do not agree with an ex-ante control over
asset prices. They consider that once the predictive content of asset prices for ination has been
accounted for, monetary authorities should not respond to movements in assets prices. Instead,
central banks should act only if it is expected that they a¤ect ination forecast or after the burst of
a nancial bubble in order to avoid damages to the real economy. Similarly, for housing markets,
Aoki et al. (2004) argue that there is a collateral transmission mechanism to consumption but do
not condition on monetary policy. Chirinko et al. (2008) stress the role that housing shocks have
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in the formulation of monetary policy vis-a-vis equity shocks. Iacoviello and Neri (2010) show that
residential investment and housing prices are very sensitive to monetary policy and the wealth
e¤ects from housing on consumption are positive and signicant.
The interaction between monetary policy and the futures market is also analyzed by Dri¢ ll et al.
(2006) in the context of a linear reaction function. They nd evidence supporting the inclusion of
futures prices, which are considered as a proxy for nancial stability. This issue is also investigated
by Castro (2010b), who builds a nancial indicator that includes the exchange rate, share and
house prices, and credit spread and futures interest rate spread in the estimation of a Taylor rule
for some central banks.
In most of the studies mentioned so far, the monetary policy reaction function is not modelled
in the context of parsimoniously restricted multivariate time-series models, an issue that the works
of Leeper and Zha (2003) and Sims and Zha (2006) have nicely overcome. Moreover, the analysis
has typically focused on asset prices, therefore, not targeting the impact of central banks actions
on households wealth composition. The rst attempts to tackle this issue are Sousa (2010b, 2010c)
who, using data for the US and the Euro Area, shows that a monetary contraction generates
an important (negative) wealth e¤ect, and leads to a quick adjustment in nancial wealth and a
gradual and persistent response by housing wealth. Note, however, that the authors analysis is
aimed at looking at the impact of monetary policy on asset markets and not on how it reacts to
developments in such markets. In this context, Christiano et al. (1996) show that a contraction in
monetary policy leads to an increase of the net funds raised by non-nancial corporations, while
leaving net funds raised by households unchanged.
The extraordinary events associated with the current nancial turmoil have brought the strength
of the relationship between wealth, the nancial and the housing sectors and monetary conduction
to the rst place. In fact, portfolio diversication e¤ects are important and nancial market inter-
dependence is crucial. Additionally, the above mentioned econometric models assume the existence
of a linear reaction of monetary policy to economic developments. Therefore, they neglect the exis-
tence of important nonlinear linkages. For instance, if the central bank is assigns di¤erent weights
to negative and positive dynamics (say, in ination) in its loss function, then a nonlinear monetary
rule will be able to capture such behaviour of monetary policy.
As a result, the literature has recently started to consider nonlinearity or asymmetry in the
analysis of monetary policy. In general, these features underlie nonlinear macroeconomic models
(Dolado et al., 2005), or asymmetric central bank preferences (Nobay and Peel, 2003; Surico, 2007a),
or both (Surico, 2007b). In particular, Surico (2007b) studies the presence of nonlinearity in the
ECB monetary policy. The author estimates a linear GMM model drawn from the derivation of
a loss function with asymmetric preferences and the existence of a convex aggregate supply curve.
6
He shows that output contractions imply larger monetary policy responses than output expansions
of the same size. Castro (2010b) also nds evidence of an asymmetric response of the ECB with
regards to developments in ination. Contrary to Surico (2007b), the author relies on a nonlinear
STR model for monetary policy, which conrms that the ECB follows a point ination target close
to 2%. In addition, there is evidence of nonlinearity for the BoE - which denes a target range
for ination -, but not for the Fed. In contrast, Petersen (2007) nds support for the existence
of nonlinearity in the monetary policy of the Fed using a simple logistic STR model. Martin and
Milas (2004) apply a nonlinear quadratic logistic STR model to the BoEs monetary policy. They
show that the UK monetary authority tries to keep ination within a range rather than pursuing a
point target, and show that nonlinearity is important. Taylor and Davradakis (2006) conrm this
evidence using a simple threshold autoregressive model, i.e. without allowing a smooth transition
between high and low ination regimes.
While assessing the linkages between monetary policy and asset markets, we improve and extend
the existing literature in several directions. First, we distinguish between the linear response of
monetary policy to wealth composition (that is, the reaction to nancial and housing wealth, which
captures the "quantity" e¤ects) and asset prices (that is, the adjustment to stock and housing prices,
which tracks the "price" e¤ects). Second, we explore the presence of nonlinearity in monetary policy,
while controlling for the possibility that central banks react di¤erently to wealth composition and
asset prices and conditioning the e¤ect on the "state" of the ination rate. Finally, we compare
the empirical evidence for the Euro Area, the US, and the UK.
3 Empirical Methodology
3.1 A Linear Approach: The Fully Simultaneous System
We estimate the following Structural VAR (SVAR)
  (L)| {z }
nn
Xt|{z}
n1
=  0Xt +  1Xt 1 + :::: = c+ "t where "tjXs; s < t  N (0;) (1)
where   (L) is a matrix valued polynomial in positive powers of the lag operator L, n is the number
of variables in the system, and "t is a vector of fundamental economic shocks that span the space
of innovations to Xt. The reduced formform of (1) can be expressed as
  10   (L)Xt = B (L)Xt = a+ vt  N (0;) (2)
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where  =   10 
 
  10
0
; the vector vt =   10 "t contains the innovations of Xt, and  0 pins down
the contemporaneous relations among the variables in the system. In what follows we use the
normalization  = I.
We follow Leeper and Zha (2003) and Sims and Zha (2006) in that we: (i) do not assume that
the central bank reacts only to variables that are predetermined relative to policy shocks; and (ii)
assume that there are no predetermined variables with respect to the policy shock. The economy
is divided into three sectors: a nancial, a monetary and a production sector. The nancial sector
reacts contemporaneously to all new information and is summarized by the commodity price index
(cp). The monetary sector allows for simultaneous e¤ects, and comprises: (i) money demand
that links money reserves (m) with the short-term interest rate (i), the real GDP (y), and the GDP
deator (p); and (ii) "money supply, where monetary authority reacts to commodity prices (cp),
money reserves (m) and the interest rate (i). Finally, the production sector consists of log real GDP
(y), unemployment rate (u), and the GDP deator (p). This sector reacts contemporaneously to
the nancial sector but not directly to the monetary sector.
While estimating the monetary policy rule, we consider several specications, namely, by linking
the interest rate (i) with: 1) money reserves (m) (Leeper and Zha, 2003); 2) money reserves (m)
and aggregate wealth (w) (Sousa, 2010c); 3) money reserves (m) and nancial wealth (fw) (Sousa,
2010b); 4) money reserves (m), nancial wealth (fw) and housing wealth (hw); 5) money reserves
(m) and commodity prices (Sims and Zha, 2006); 6) money reserves (m), aggregate wealth (w),
and commodity prices (cp); 7) money reserves (m) and exchange rate (er) (Lubik and Schorfheide,
2007), and 8)money reserves (m), aggregate wealth (w), and commodity prices (cp). These di¤erent
policy reactions allow us to understand how the monetary authority reacts to wealth composition.
Then, we assess the adjustment of monetary policy in the outcome of changes in asset prices. More
specically, we estimate a number of policy rules that link the interest rate (i) with: 1) money
reserves (m) and stock prices (sp); and 2) money reserves (m), stock prices (sp) and housing prices
(hp). In this way, we are able to detect whether the central bank reacts di¤erently to changes in the
wealth composition vis-a-vis changes in asset prices. This analysis is crucial as it makes possible
to infer about the weights that the monetary authority puts into asset marketsquantity and price
e¤ects.
Finally, the fully simultaneous identication scheme as dened above implies that the estimates
of  0 are obtained via numerical maximization of the integrated likelihood. The condence bands
for the impulse-response functions should be constructed by drawing jointly from the posterior
distribution of B (L) and  0. Given that the integrated likelihood is not in the form of any
standard probability density function, one cannot draw  0 from it directly to make inference.
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We solve this problem by: (i) taking draws for  0 using an importance sampling approach that
combines the posterior distribution with the asymptotic distribution of  0; and (ii) drawing B (L)
from its posterior distribution conditional on  0. Condence bands are then constructed from the
weighted percentiles of the impulse-response functions. This approach is explained in detail in the
Appendix B.
3.2 A Nonlinear Approach: The Smooth Transition Regression Model
The traditional monetary rules, like the Taylor rule, are simple linear functions that represent
central bankspolicy rules under the condition that they are minimizing a symmetric quadratic
loss function and that the aggregate supply function is linear. However, in reality, this may not
be the case and central banks can be responding di¤erently to deviations of aggregates from their
targets. Ination and the output gap tend to show an asymmetric adjustment to the business cycle:
output exhibits short and sharp recessions over the business cycle, but long and smooth recoveries;
ination increases more rapidly than it decreases (Hamilton, 1989). If the central bank indeed
assigns di¤erent weights to negative and positive ination, output gaps, wealth composition or
asset prices (relative to the respective targets) in its loss function, then a nonlinear monetary rule
may reect that behaviour.
Therefore, we employ a smooth transition regression (STR) model. While allowing for smooth
endogenous regime switches, it is able to explain when a central bank changes its policy rule.
Although a few versions of this model have been applied to study the behaviour of some relevant
central banks, we provide the rst attempt to control for the presence of a nonlinear reaction of
central banks to wealth composition and asset prices.
A standard STR model for a nonlinear monetary rule can be dened as follows:1
it =  
0zt + !0ztG(; c; st) + "t; t = 1; :::; T (3)
where zt = (1; z1t; :::zkt) is a vector of k explanatory variables. The vectors  = ( 0;  1; :::;  k)
and ! = (!0; !1; :::; !k) represent the parameter vectors in the linear and nonlinear parts of the
model, respectively. In total, we have k+1 parameters to estimate, and some of these may be zero
a priori. The disturbance term is assumed to be independent and identically distributed with zero
mean and constant variance, "t  iid(0; 2). The transition function G(; c; st) is continuous and
bounded between zero and one in the transition variable st, that is, as st !  1, G(; c; st) ! 0
and as st ! +1, G(; c; st) ! 1. st, can be an element of zt or even a linear combination of
elements of zt (or a simple deterministic trend).
1For further details, see Granger and Teräsvirta (1993), Teräsvirta (1998) and van Dijk et al. (2002).
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We start by considering G(; c; st) as a logistic function of order one:
G(; c; st) = [1 + exp f  (st   c)g] 1 ;  > 0: (4)
This kind of STR model is called logistic STR model or LSTR1 model. In this case, the transition
function is a monotonically increasing function of st, where the slope parameter, , indicates the
smoothness of the transition from one regime to another, i.e. it shows how rapid the transition
from zero to unity is, as a function of st. Finally, the location parameter, c, determines where the
transition occurs. Considering this framework, the LSTR1 model can describe relationships that
change according to the level of the threshold variable and, consequently, an asymmetric reaction
of the central bank to, for example, a high and a low ination regime.
The STR model is equivalent to a linear model with stochastic time-varying coe¢ cients and, as
so, it can be rewritten as:
it =

 0 + !0G(; c; st)

zt + "t , it =  0zt + "t; t = 1; :::; T: (5)
The combined parameters, , will uctuate between  and  + ! and change monotonically as a
function of st. The more the transition variable moves beyond the threshold, the closer G(; c; st)
will be to one, and the closer  will be to  +!. Similarly, the further st approaches the threshold,
c, the closer the transition function will be to zero and the closer  will be to  .
Given that a monotonic transition may not be a satisfactory alternative, we will also consider
(and test for) the presence of a non-monotonic transition function. This can be the case where
central banks consider not a simple point target for the transition variable, but a band or an inner
regime where the transition variable - for instance, ination - is considered to be under control.
Consequently, the reaction of the monetary authority will be di¤erent from the situation where
ination is outside that regime.
We consider the following logistic function of order two:
G(; c; st) = [1 + exp f  (st   c1) (st   c2)g] 1 ;  > 0; (6)
where c = fc1; c2g and c1  c2. This transition function is symmetric around (c1 + c2)=2 and
asymmetric, otherwise, and the model becomes linear when  ! 0. If  ! 1 and c1 6= c2,
G(; c; st) becomes equal to zero for c1  st  c2 and equal to one for other values; when st ! 1,
G(; c; st)! 1. This model is called the quadratic logistic STR or LSTR2. If, for example, ination
is the transition variable, this model allows us to estimate separate lower and upper bands for the
ination instead of a simple target value.
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In the estimation of the nonlinear model, it is important to test whether the behaviour of
monetary policy in a given country can be really described by a nonlinear rule. This implies testing
linearity against the STR model. The null hypothesis of linearity is H0 :  = 0 and the alternative
hypothesis is H1 :  > 0. Neither the LSTR1 model nor the LSTR2 model are dened under the
null hypothesis; they are only dened under the alternative. Teräsvirta (1998) and van Dijk et al.
(2002) show that this identication problem can be solved by approximating the transition function
with a third-order Taylor-series expansion around the null hypothesis. This approximation yields,
after some simplications and re-parameterisations, the following auxiliary regression:
it = 
0
0zt + 
0
1eztst + 02ezts2t + 03ezts3t + "t ; t = 1; :::; T; (7)
where "t = "t + !0ztR(; c; st), with the remainder R(; c; st), zt = (1; ez0t)0, and ezt is a (k  1)
vector of explanatory variables. Moreover, j = ej , where ej is a function of ! and c. The null
hypothesis of linearity becomes H01 : 1 = 2 = 3 = 0, against the alternative of H11 : 9j 6= 0;
j = 1; 2; 3. An LM-test can be used to investigate this hypothesis because "t = "t under the null.
The resulting asymptotic distribution is 2 with 3k degrees of freedom under the null (Teräsvirta,
1998). If linearity is rejected, we can proceed with the estimation of the nonlinear model. However,
in this process it is important to select the adequate transition variable. Sometimes, it is clear
from the economic theory which one to choose. However, Teräsvirta (1998) argues that if there
is no theoretical reason to choose one variable over another to be the threshold variable, and if
nonlinearity is rejected for more than one transition variable, the variable presenting the lowest
p-value for the rejection of linearity should be chosen to be the transition variable.2
There is a nal question to answer before proceeding with the estimation of the nonlinear model:
Which transition function should be employed? The decision between an LSTR1 and an LSTR2
model can be made from the following sequence of null hypotheses based on the auxiliary regression:
H02 : 3 = 0; H03 : 2 = 0j3 = 0; and H04 : 1 = 0j3 = 2 = 0. Granger and Teräsvirta (1993)
show that the decision rule works as follows: if the p-value from the rejection of H03 is the lowest
one, we should choose an LSTR2 model; otherwise, the LSTR1 model should be selected.
2Theoretically, we would choose inzation to be the threshold variable because of the important weight central
banks have been putting on this variable. However, despite this expectation, we will take into account Teräsvirtas
(1998) suggestion and choose for transition variable the one that presents the lowest p-value for the rejection of the
linear model.
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4 Does the Monetary Authority React to Wealth Composition?
4.1 Data
This Section provides a summary description of the data employed in the empirical analysis. A
detailed version can be found in Section A of the Appendix. All variables are in natural logarithms
and measured at constant prices unless stated otherwise.
The set of variables considered in the econometric methodologies is as follows. First, we use the
short-term interest rate (i) as the monetary policy instrument. Second, regarding macroeconomic
aggregates, we consider the choice of variables of the works of Leeper and Zha (2003) and Sims
and Zha (2006). Therefore, we include: the real GDP (y), the GDP deator (p), the producer
price index of raw materials (cp), and the unemployment rate (u). The monetary aggregate (m)
corresponds toM3, in the case of the Euro Area,M2, for the US, andM4, in the UK, as these are the
relevant ones for assessing the behavior of money markets and long-term price stability. Finally, the
variables of interest in the monetary policy rule are: (1) the aggregate wealth (w); (2) the measure
of the nancial market (that is, either nancial wealth (fw) or the stock price index(sp)); (3) the
measure of the housing market (that is, either housing wealth (hw) or the housing price index(hp));
and (4) the real e¤ective exchange rate (er). The data are available: for the period 1980:1-2007:4,
in the case of the Euro Area; 1967:2-2008:4, for the US; and 1975:1-2007:4, in the UK.
4.2 Linear Evidence
We start by presenting and discussing the evidence from the estimation of the linear monetary
rules using the fully simultaneous system approach described in Section 3.1. Tables 1, 2 and 3
summarize the results for the Euro Area, the US and the UK, respectively. In particular, they
provide information about the median estimates and the 68% probability intervals computed using
a Monte Carlo Importance Sampling algorithm (and based on 50000 draws) of the coe¢ cients
associated with the variables included in the di¤erent monetary policy rules (Rows 1 to 8).
Table 1 shows that the ECB strongly responds to the money stock: disturbances that raise the
M3 aggregate induce an increase in the interest rate. In fact, Column 2 shows that the coe¢ cient
associated with the monetary aggregate is large in magnitude, therefore, revealing the importance
of this policy instrument in the conduction of ECBs monetary policy. Similarly, our results suggest
that the monetary authority keeps a vigilant posture regarding developments in aggregate wealth.
In particular, specications (2), (6) and (7) show that the coe¢ cient associated with aggregate
wealth is large in magnitude and has the expected sign: an increase in aggregate wealth leads
to a rise in the interest rate. These ndings are in accordance with the work of Sousa (2010b).
When we focus on wealth composition (rows 3 and 4), we nd that the monetary authority pays a
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special attention to the dynamics of nancial wealth: as in the case of aggregate wealth, monetary
policy is tightened when nancial wealth rises. In contrast, monetary policy seems to be relaxed
in the outcome of an expansion in housing wealth. This duality is important as it suggests that, in
the attempt of stabilizing nancial wealth, the central bank may allow for an amplication of the
dynamics of housing wealth. In addition, it is linked with the concerns about a possible business
cycle de-synchronization, as suggested by Raq and Mallick(2008) and Mallick and Mohsin (2010).
Rows 5 and 6 assess whether the monetary authority systematically reacts to changes in commodity
prices. The results show that the developments in commodity markets do not seem to play a major
role for the conduction of ECBs monetary policy. The coe¢ cient associated with the commodity
price is typically small in magnitude and somewhat imprecisely estimated. Rows 7 and 8 provide
weak evidence of a systematic reaction of the ECB to changes in real e¤ective exchange rate.
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE]
Similarly to the case of the Euro Area, Table 2 shows that the monetary authority in the US
vigilates very closely the dynamics of money markets: a rise in M2 leads to a strong increase in
the interest rate, as can be seen in specications (1) to (4). Nevertheless, rows 5 to 8 suggest
that the interest rate dynamics is also relevant. As a result, this piece of evidence shows that Fed
adopts a more exible conduction of monetary policy, namely, by considering both the monetary
aggregate and the interest rate behaviours. Column 3 reports that the monetary authority vigilates
the developments in aggregate wealth, despite not placing a great weight to them in the policy rule.
Nevertheless, this hides an important wealth composition e¤ect, that is: (i) equations (3) and (4)
clearly show that developments in nancial wealth substantially impact on the conduct of monetary
policy and, in particular, a rise in nancial wealth is strongly counteracted by a rise in the interest
rate; and (ii) equation (4) reveals that developments in housing wealth do not seem to deserve
a crucial role in the policy rule, as the coe¢ cient associated with this component of wealth is
typically small. That is, similarly to the case of the Euro Area, our results suggest that Feds
attempts to mitigate movements in nancial wealth may disrupt the behaviour of housing wealth.
In line with this evidence and although in a di¤erent context, Granville and Mallick (2009) also
emphasize the importance of the linkages between monetary and nancial stability. Specications
(5) and (6) highlight the "active" response of the US monetary authority regarding the behaviour
of commodity prices: a rise in the commodity price index leads to an increase in the interest rate.
In this way, the Fed tries to counterbalance the inationary pressure from the rise in the price of
raw materials, a feature that clearly distinguishes it from the ECB. Rows 7 and 8 provide additional
evidence of the "activism" of monetary policy in the US. In fact, the real e¤ective exchange rate
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enters signicantly in the formulation of monetary policy rule: a fall in the exchange rate (that is,
a real depreciation of domestic currency) is typically followed by a monetary policy contraction.
[INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE]
Finally, Table 3 shows that, in contrast with the Euro Area and the US, the UK monetary au-
thority does not seem to emphasize the developments of money markets in the policy conduction.
Column 3 shows that indeed the coe¢ cient associated to the monetary aggregate is small in mag-
nitude, a feature that can not be disentangled from the fact that the BoE uses a broad monetary
aggregate measure (i.e. M4) as an indicator of the medium to long-term price (in)stability. The
empirical evidence does point to a very important role for wealth in the formulation of monetary
policy: specication (2) suggests that when aggregate wealth increases, the BoE responds by ris-
ing the interest rate. Moreover, wealth composition is key, as equations (3) and (4) highlight. In
particular, a rise in housing wealth is mitigated by an increase in the interest rate, while a fall in
nancial wealth leads to the same policy reaction. That is: (i) in contrast with the Euro Area
and the US, housing markets developments seem to be the key in the conduction of monetary
policy in the UK; and (ii) similarly to the ECB and the Fed, our results emphasize the di¢ culty of
stabilizing both wealth components. This may be a source of concern given the important economic
costs associated with periods of extreme variation in asset prices (Agnello and Schuknecht, 2009).
In accordance with the ndings for the US, specications (5) and (6) reveal that the monetary
authority in the UK is also very "active" towards the developments in commodity prices. In fact,
the potentially inationary e¤ects of a rise in commodity prices are strongly balanced by a strong
rise in the interest rate. Similarly, equations (7) and (8) add further evidence of a very "active"
monetary authority with regards to the dynamics of foreign exchange markets. This is reected in
the large and signicant coe¢ cient associated with the real e¤ective exchange rate in the monetary
policy rule. It suggests that monetary policy in tightened (that is, interest rate is raised) when
there is a real depreciation of the domestic currency.
[INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE]
4.3 Nonlinear Evidence
The evidence from the estimation of the nonlinear monetary rules is presented in this section.
The results are rst reported for the Euro Area (Table 4), then for the US (Table 5) and, nally,
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for the UK (Table 6). We also provide some robustness checks considering the larger time period
that is common to the three economic blocks: 1981-2007 (Table 7).
In general, results are robust in supporting the idea that the monetary policy followed by the
ECB, Fed and BoE exhibit some nonlinearities. In fact, the tests provided at the bottom of Tables
4 to 6 (see line H01) corroborate that evidence at a level of signicance of 1%. Ination was chosen
to be the threshold variable (st = pt), because it was associated with the lowest p-value for the
rejection of the linear model. This helps explaining the important weight that central banks put
on this variable. The tests for the choice of the transition function are presented at the bottom
of Tables 4 to 7 (see lines H02, H03 and H04) and indicate that an LSTR1 ts better the analysis
carried on this study. This means that, over the time period, the respective central banks seem to
be more concerned in pursuing a point target than a target range for ination.
In general, we expect that central banks have a specic reaction to economic developments when
ination is below the abovementioned targets and a di¤erent (stronger or weaker) reaction when
ination increases beyond them. Results provide such evidence for some variables. In the next
step, we analyze those results in detail, giving particular attention to the reaction of the monetary
authority to wealth composition. For each economic block, we start by estimating what we call a
basic nonlinear Taylor rule, where we assume that the central bank reacts to ination and output
gap by changing the interest rate. In addition, we assume that the response should be di¤erent
when ination is below or above the target (c).
Results are quite interesting, in particular, for the Euro Area, as can be seen in Table 4. They
show that the ECB reacts to ination (pt) only when it increases signicantly above an estimated
target of 2.6%;3 as ination decreases below that target, the reaction to ination also smoothly
weakens. When ination is below 2.6%, the only signicant reaction is related with the output gap
(yt). In the next two regressions (Columns 3 and 4), we add money (mt) and aggregate wealth
(wt) to the model. This provides a better tting according to the Schwarz Bayesian Information
Criteria (SBIC).4 Column 4 shows that the ination and output gap e¤ects signicantly behave in
accordance with the "Taylor Principle", but the stabilizing e¤ect over ination is felt only when it
rises above 2.7%; the output gap is always a concern for the ECB. Contrary to Surico (2007b), we
nd evidence that the monetary authority has reacted to money supply over the period 1981-2007.
3When ination is above 2.6%, for each percentage point increase in ination, the ECB reacts by raising the nominal
interest rate by about 0.9 to 1.4 percentage points. As the coe¢ cient on ination is, in most of the regressions, higher
than 1, that implies that the real interest rate will increase as well. As a result, the monetary behaviour of the ECB
will exert the required and desired stabilizing e¤ect over ination. In fact, according to the "Taylor Principle", for
the monetary policy to be stabilizing, the coe¢ cient on ination should exceed the unity and the coe¢ cient on the
output gap should be positive.
4Here we should stress that we start by presenting the estimation results with all variables in the linear and non-
linear parts Then, we present (and analyse) the results from the best tting models. Those are found by sequentially
eliminating regressors that are not statistically signicant, namely, by using the SBIC measure of t. Therefore, we
report the combination of e¤ects ( +!) - when present - only for the best tting models (see columns 3, 6, 7 and 8).
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In particular, when ination is above 2.7%, increases in money supply are followed by rises in the
interest rate. In fact, the overall e¤ect ( + !) is signicantly positive, which provides evidence
that the ECB actively targets money supply when ination is "high" or surpasses a certain level
( 2:7%).5
The inclusion of wealth (wt) in the monetary reaction function shows that the e¤ect is clearly
linear despite being negative: for each percentage point increase in the growth rate of wealth, the
interest rate is cut by 0.15 percentage points. This piece of evidence can be the result of the
conicting duality between the components of aggregate wealth detected in the linear model. To
evalute that possibility, we include nancial wealth (fwt) and housing wealth (hwt) in the nonlinear
model instead of an aggregate measure of wealth (Columns 6, 7 and 8). The results suggest that
the reaction to nancial wealth is positive when ination is low (that is, below 2.8%). However,
as ination increases, there is an erosion in this e¤ect, and it even becomes negative for "high"
levels of ination. As for housing wealth, the response of the central bank is slightly di¤erent:
when ination is below 2.8%, the e¤ect is highly negative; as ination increases, its negative e¤ect
is reduced in magnitude, and becomes not statistically signicant when we do not control for fwt
(Column 8). So, there is a somewhat timid reaction of the ECB to developments in housing wealth,
which are eclipsed by the focus on ination and may lead to an amplication of the dynamics in
the housing markets. Controlling for the existence of nonlinearity in the conduction of monetary
policy reveals the di¢ culties of the monetary authority in nding the equilibrium trade-o¤ between
the e¤ects of di¤erent wealth components.
[INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE]
Table 5 reports the results for the US. Column 1 reports the results from a nonlinear version
of the basic Taylor rule. Output gap was chosen to be the threshold variable (st = yt), because it
has provided the lowest p-value for the rejection of the linear model. The empirical ndings still
respect the "Taylor Principle", in particular, when growth in output gap is higher than -1.04%.
When money growth is included in the equation, the evidence no longer supports the output gap
as the threshold variable: this role is now played (again) by the ination rate. Moreover, in all the
remaining regressions, ination and output gap obey to the "Taylor Principle" and there is some
evidence that the Fed targets money growth, especially when ination is "high". Columns 3 and
4 provide evidence against the idea that the Fed vigilates the growth in aggregate wealth, which
is somehow in line with the results obtained in the linear framework. However, when wealth is
disaggregated into nancial and housing wealth, results provide a remarkable nding: controlling
5Table 4 conrms this result in all regressions that include mt.
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for nonlinearity, one can see that the central bank does not target nancial wealth but it is concerned
with the growth in housing wealth, especially, when ination is "high". This result supports our
previous conjecture that monetary authorities tend to put a higher concern on the growth of
housing wealth than on the growth of nancial wealth, in particular, when ination surpasses a
specic target. In sum, the evidence for the US support the idea that the Fed is worried much
more with the dynamics of wealth composition than with aggregate wealth developments per se.
[INSERT TABLE 5 AROUND HERE]
The ndings for the UK are presented in Table 6. Contrary to the Euro Area and the US, the
"Taylor Principle" does not seem to be respected: the estimated coe¢ cient on ination is always
lower than one, which indicates an accommodative behaviour of interest rates to ination; on the
other hand, the BoE only reacts to output gap when ination is well above 4.8%, as Columns 1 and
2 suggest. The inclusion of money growth and wealth e¤ects in the model (Columns 3 to 8) does not
signicantly change this scenario. However, some results should be stressed. First, there is some
evidence showing that the BoE vigilates monetary developments as in the case of the Euro Area
and the US. Second, there is evidence of a signicantly positive reaction of the BoE to increases
in wealth when ination is well below 4.1%. However, when it reaches "high" levels, the BoE does
not seem to react to those e¤ects anymore. Hence, the nonlinear framework conrms the results
obtained in the linear model that aggregate wealth e¤ects matter for the BoE, but now results are
more precise in indicating that they matter only when ination is "low".
The results from the disaggregation of wealth e¤ects into nancial and housing e¤ects (Columns
5 to 8) show a reaction of the BoE that is similar to the ECB. When ination is below 4.1%, the
BoE reacts to increases in nancial wealth by rising the interest rate. However, such response
does not emerge when ination is above 4.1%. This can be explained by the illusion that higher
ination erodes the e¤ect of nancial wealth. Similarly, in such scenario, the BoE will also be much
more concerned with ination than with nancial wealth e¤ects. In the case of housing wealth, the
evidence seems to point that the central bank does not counteract the inationary pressures that
may arise from developments in that wealth component. This result may help explaining the boom
in house prices that one observed in the UK in the last decade.
[INSERT TABLE 6 AROUND HERE]
So far, we made use of all available data for each economic block, which means that the time
periods considered in the analysis are di¤erent. To check the robustness of the results and make the
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analysis more comparable, we estimate the most relevant policy reaction functions over the same
sample period (1981:1-2007:4). The results are presented in Table 7.
In the case of the Euro Area, the evidence is similar to the one reported in Table 4. The results
for the US are presented in Columns 3 and 4. The most striking nding is that the threshold
parameter for the US is more reasonable now (around 3% which compares with 7.8%, previously).
While there is not strong evidence of a reaction of the Fed to aggregate wealth, the monetary
authority has indeed vigilated its composition. In particular, the Fed has reacted to growth in
nancial wealth by increasing the interest rate. On the other hand, the growth of housing wealth
seems to be a source of concern when ination is far above the 3%.
Finally, the evidence for the UK does not change much and has some similarities with the Euro
Area, especially, regarding wealth composition. When ination is below 4%, there is some evidence
suggesting that the BoE positively reacts to increases in aggregate wealth and, in particular, in
nancial wealth (but not to housing wealth changes). Therefore, as long as the BoE is able to
keep a "low" level for ination, it also reacts to the potentially inationary wealth e¤ects. When
ination su¤ers a positive boost, the monetary policy seems to loose track of wealth developments,
in the sense that ination becomes the major "threat".
[INSERT TABLE 7 AROUND HERE]
5 Does the Monetary Policy React to Asset Prices?
5.1 Linear Evidence
We now look at the reaction of the central bank to asset prices using a linear framework. We
aim at understanding whether there are substantial di¤erences vis-a-vis the monetary policy rules
that include wealth measures. In this way, we can assess the "quantity" and "price" impact of asset
marketsdevelopments in the formulation of the monetary policy rule.
Table 8 summarizes the results for the Euro Area (rows 1 and 2), the US (rows 3 and 4) and
the UK (rows 5 and 6), respectively. In particular, it reports the median estimates and the 68%
probability intervals computed using a Monte Carlo Importance Sampling algorithm and based on
50000 draws.
The empirical evidence suggests that both the ECB and the Fed place a major role to devel-
opments in money markets. In particular, disturbances that raise the relevant monetary aggregate
lead to a strong increase in the interest rate. Only the BoE seems to a little bit of more emphasis
on the interest rate as the policy instrument.
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Our results also highlight the importance of the composition of asset prices in designing the
policy rule. In the case of the Euro Area, there is mixed evidence regarding the inclusion of stock
prices in the monetary policy reaction. In what concerns housing prices, monetary policy seems to
be relaxed when there is an increase in this set of asset prices. For the US and the UK, the results
also reveal that the composition of asset prices matter. However and, in contrast with the evidence
for the Euro Area, the ndings suggest that monetary policy tends to counteract the developments
of housing prices while accommodating the dynamics of stock prices, that is: (i) a rise in housing
prices leads to an increase of the interest rate; and (ii) the policy instrument decreases in the
outcome of a rise in stock prices.
Taken together, these ndings conrm that central banks may nd it quite di¢ cult to simulta-
neously stabilize stock and housing prices. In fact, the attempts to circumvent the developments
in housing prices may lead to an unstabilizing e¤ect on stock prices. In addition, given that the
coe¢ cients associated with asset prices are substantially smaller than the ones linked with wealth
components in the di¤erent monetary policy rule specications, our work suggests that central
banks do not seem to be particularly concerned with "price" e¤ects. However, they do focus enor-
mously on the developments of wealth, which strongly indicates that monetary authorities fear
the impact of those dynamics in real economic activity and, in particular, in the achievement of
medium to long-term price stability.
[INSERT TABLE 8 AROUND HERE]
5.2 Nonlinear Evidence
After analyzing the reaction of monetary policy to asset prices using a linear framework, we
are tempted to ask whether there are nonlinearities in the central banks reaction function to this
set of prices. To answer that question, we use the STR model where we control for the e¤ects of
housing and stock prices.
The results from the estimation of the nonlinear monetary rules for the Euro Area, the US
and the UK are presented in Table 9. They support the presence of nonlinearities in the policy
reaction function of the ECB, the Fed and the BoE. In particular, the linearity tests reported at
the bottom of Table 9 (see line H01) show that the linearity hypothesis can be rejected at a level of
signicance of 1% in all estimations. Ination is chosen as the threshold variable (st = pt), in line
with the lowest p-value for the rejection of the linear model. Lines H02, H03 and H04 report the tests
for the choice of the transition function. As in the case of the analysis regarding the inclusion of
wealth variables in the monetary policy reaction function, they indicate that the LSTR1 model has
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the best t. Hence, when the nonlinear monetary rule is augmented with asset prices, the results
corroborate the evidence that suggests that the three monetary authorities are more concerned in
pursuing a point target than a target range for ination.
[INSERT TABLE 9 AROUND HERE]
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 9 summarize the results for the Euro Area over the period 1981:1-
2007:4. In the rst Column, we include all variables in the linear and nonlinear parts of the model;
in Column 2, we report only the results from the best tting model. This model is found by
sequentially eliminating the regressors that are not statistically signicant, namely, with the use
of the SBIC measure of t.6 The evidence conrms that the ECB reacts to output and ination
according to the "Taylor Principle", but the response to ination is only statistically signicant
when ination surpasses 2.6%. Similarly, the ECB seems to avoid inationary pressures that may
result from increases in money growth, but only when ination is "high". Regarding the reaction to
asset prices, the results show a signicantly positive reaction to increases in the commodity prices,
but no signicant reaction to the stock prices is found. The response to housing prices is, as in the
case of the linear framework, negative, especially, when ination is "low". This can be reecting
an easing of monetary policy in terms of credit access for new housing purchases. However, when
general ination goes above the 2.6% threshold, the monetary authority starts reacting di¤erently
to an increase in housing prices.
Similar regressions for the US are presented in Columns 3 to 5. Columns 3 and 4 are estimated
over the entire period for which data are available, that is, 1968:1-2008:4; Column 5 reports the
results for the period 1981:1-2007:4, which allows a direct comparison with the evidence for the Euro
Area. The reaction of monetary policy to ination and output gap respects the "Taylor Principle"
in all regressions. Moreover, there is evidence that the Fed reacts to developments in the money
markets. Regarding the response to asset prices, there is a clearly positive reaction to an increases
in stock prices. Hence, as expected, the Fed targets rises the interest rate in order to mitigate the
potentially unstabilizing e¤ects of stock pricesuctuations. This reaction is independent of the
level of general ination, i.e. of whether general ination is "low" or "high". A di¤erent pattern is
observed for the response to an increase in housing prices: when ination is "low", the Fed reduces
the interest rate, possibly in order to accommodate the increase in demand for mortgages. When
we focus on the time period 1981-2007, the evidence is quite similar to the one found for the ECB,
i.e. as ination surpasses the threshold of 2.8%, the Fed starts reacting to an increase in housing
prices in a di¤erent manner, but the overall e¤ect is not statistically signicant. In this period, the
6We report the combination of e¤ects ( + !) - when present - only for the best tting model.
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empirical ndings also suggest some concerns over commodity prices, but only when ination is
"high". These results support the argument that the US monetary policy authority keeps vigilant
regarding asset prices (Cecchetti et al., 2000).
Finally, Columns 6 to 7 provide a summary of the results for monetary policy reaction functions
augmented with asset prices in the case of the UK and over the period 1975:1-2007:1. In Column 8,
the sample period is 1981:1-2007:4 In the analysis of the reaction of the Bank of England to wealth
composition, the evidence did not support the "Taylor Principle". However, this is no longer the
case when we include asset prices in the policy specications. First, the BoE reacts to increases in
stock prices by increasing the interest rate when ination is below 4.4%. However, in the period
1981:1-2007:4, the monetary authority seems to be always concerned about the behavior of stock
prices, no matter what the "state" of the ination is. This may reect the process of nancial
deregulation that started in the eighties and which has increased the exposure of the economy as
a whole to the developments in nancial markets. As a result, a stronger track of such dynamics
is observed in this period. Second, contrary to the ECB and the Fed that react to an increase in
housing prices by reducing the interest rate only when ination is "low", the BoE seems to promote
such behaviour for every ination level. This may reveal a stronger accommodation of housing (and
mortgage) demand shocks and contribute to explain the boom in the UK housing market.
Summing up, our results suggest that: 1) monetary authorities target stock prices and try
to mitigate unstabilizing developments in nancial markets, especially, when ination is "low";
and 2) central banks allow interest rates to fall in response to an increase in housing prices, in
particular, when ination does not represent a major threat to price stability. In accordance with
the evidence provided by the linear framework, this conrms the idea that it may be quite di¢ cult
to simultaneously mitigate the adverse dynamics in stock and housing prices without triggering an
unstable amplication of the developments in one market.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we assess the relationship between monetary policy and asset markets. Using
quarterly data for the Euro Area, the US and the UK, we estimate monetary policy reaction
functions that allow us to understand how a central bank reacts to wealth composition and asset
prices. That is, we compare the adjustment of the conduction of monetary policy in the outcome
of "quantity" e¤ects vis-a-vis "price" e¤ects enhanced by asset market developments.
We pay close attention to the design of the monetary policy rule. Specically, we estimate
a linear policy reaction function based on a fully simultaneous system approach in a Bayesian
framework. Then, we investigate the existence of nonlinearity using a smooth transition regression
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model.
The linear framework suggests that all central banks vigilate the developments in aggregate
wealth, and wealth composition is indeed important in the formulation of monetary policy. In
particular, while the ECB and the Fed pay a special attention to the dynamics of nancial wealth,
the BoE tends to focus on housing wealth developments. Consequently, the attempts of central
banks to mitigate undesirable uctuations in say, nancial wealth, may disrupt housing wealth.
This result reects the importance of the linkages between monetary stability and nancial stability
(Castro, 2010b; Granville and Mallick, 2009; Sousa, 2010b).
A similar policy implication can be drawn when we assess the reaction of the monetary authority
to asset prices. However, the estimated policy rules show that the coe¢ cients associated with asset
prices are substantially smaller than the ones linked with wealth components, which reects the
smaller concern about asset "price" e¤ects.
Additionally, we show that: (i) both the ECB and the Fed strongly respond to the dynamics
in money markets, while the BoE conducts monetary policy by looking at both the monetary
aggregate and the interest rate dynamics; (ii) the Fed and the BoE are particularly "active" in
mitigating the potentially inationary e¤ects that are driven by a rise in commodity prices or a
depreciation of domestic currency.
The results of the estimation of the nonlinear smooth transition regression model show that
central banks react to aggregate wealth developments, especially, when ination is "low". The
concerns over wealth composition seem to be particularly strong in the case of the Fed.
In what concerns the reaction to asset prices, the monetary authorities target asset prices even
when we control for the existence of nonlinearity. Specically, the Fed and the BoE seem to be
particularly responsive to stock and commodity prices when ination is under control. In contrast,
there is evidence of an accommodative behavior relative to developments in housing prices. While
this may be linked to the goal of stabilizing the demand of housing and mortgages in the market, it
can lead to a disruption in nancial markets. A de-synchronization of the business cycle may be an
important consequence of the di¢ culties found by the monetary authority in mitigating unpleasant
developments that hit simultaneously the housing and the nancial markets (Raq and Mallick,
2008; Mallick and Mohsin, 2010).
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Appendix
A Data Description
A.1 Euro Area Data
Euro Area aggregates are calculated as weighted average of euro-11 before 1999 and, thereafter, as
break-corrected series covering the real-time composition of the Euro Area.
GDP
Seasonally adjusted nominal GDP (stocks) at market prices. From 1999:1 onwards, this series
covers nominal GDP of the real-time composition of the Euro Area, correcting for the breaks
caused by the several enlargements, i.e. currently the observations from 2007:4 backwards are
extrapolations based on growth rates calculated from the levels series compiled for the Euro Area
15 in 2008. For period before 1999, the nominal GDP series for the Euro Area is constructed
by aggregating national GDP data for euro 11 using the irrevocable xed exchange rates of 31
December 1998 for the period 1980:1-1998:4. Again, growth rates from this series are used to
backward extend the Euro Area GDP series.
The Euro Area seasonally adjusted real GDP series (at 2000 constant prices) has been con-
structed before 1999 by aggregating national real GDP data using the irrevocable xed exchange
rates. As for the Euro Area nominal GDP, an articial Euro Area real GDP series has also been con-
structed using the procedure illustrated above. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, expressed
in million of Euro, and comprise the period 1980:1-2007:4.
Price Deator
All variables are expressed in real terms by using the GDP deator. The GDP deator is
calculated as a simple ratio between nominal and real GDP. The year base is 2000 (2000 = 100).
Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period 1980:1-2007:4.
Monetary Aggregate
All the data used are denominated in euro. The seasonally adjusted M3 series for the Euro
Area has been constructed using the index of adjusted stocks for the corresponding real time
composition of the currency area. This index corrects for breaks due to enlargement, but as well
for reclassications, exchange rate revaluations and other revaluations. In order to translate the
index into outstanding amounts, the M3 seasonally adjusted index of adjusted stocks for the Euro
Area has been re-based to be equal to the value of the seasonally adjusted stock for the Euro Area
M3 in January 2008. Before 1999, stocks and ows of the estimated Euro AreaM3are derived by
by aggregating national stocks and ows at irrevocable xed exchange rates. Data are seasonally
adjusted quarterly averages covering the period 1980:2 to 2007:4.
Short-Run Interest Rate
For short-term interest rates from January 1999 onwards, the Euro Area three-month Euribor
is used. Before 1999, the articial Euro Area nominal interest rates used are estimated as weighted
averages of national interest rates calculated with xed weights based on 1999 GDP at PPP ex-
change rates. National short-term rates are three-month market rates. Data are quarterly averages,
and comprise the period 1980:1-2007:4.
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Producer Price Index
World market prices of raw materials. Total index. USD basis, converted into euro. Weighted
according to commodity imports of OECD countries, 1989-1991, excluding EU- internal trade.
Share in total index: 100%. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, and comprise the period
1980:1-2007:4.
Aggregate wealth
Aggregate wealth is dened as the net worth of households and nonprot organizations, this is,
the sum of nancial wealth and housing wealth. Original series are provided at quarterly frequency
from the Euro Area quarterly sectoral accounts for the period 1999:1-2007:4 and at annual frequency
from the monetary union nancial accounts for the period 1995-1998 and from national sources for
the period 1980-1994. Quarterly data before 1999 are back-casted and interpolated using quadratic
smoothing and corrected for breaks. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, expressed in million
of Euro, and comprise the period 1980:1-2007:4.
Financial wealth
Net nancial wealth is the di¤erence between nancial assets (currency and deposits, debt se-
curities, shares and mutual fund shares, insurance reserves, net others) and nancial liabilities (ex-
cluding mortgage loans) held by households and non-prot institutions serving households. Original
series are provided at quarterly frequency from the Euro Area quarterly sectoral accounts for the
period 1999:1-2007:4 and at annual frequency from the monetary union nancial accounts for the
period 1995-1998 and from national sources for the period 1980-1994. Quarterly data before 1999
are back-casted and interpolated using quadratic smoothing and corrected for breaks. Data are
quarterly, seasonally adjusted, expressed in million of Euro, and comprise the period 1980:1-2007:4.
Housing wealth
Net housing wealth is the di¤erence between gross housing wealth and mortgage loans held by
households and non-prot institutions serving households. Original series are provided at annual
frequency and quarterly data are back-casted and interpolated using quadratic smoothing. Housing
wealth data are at current replacement costs net of capital depreciation based on ECB estimates.
Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted, expressed in million of Euro, and comprise the period
1980:1-2007:4.
Stock Market Index
The source is the International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF).
 For Belgium: series "12462...ZF Share price index (Share prices: INDUSTRIAL)";
 For Denmark: series "12862A..ZF Share prices: Industrial";
 For Finland: series "17262...ZF Share price index (Share prices: Industrial)";
 For France: series "13262...ZF Share price index (Share prices)";
 For Germany: series "13462...ZF Share price index (Share prices)";
 For Ireland: series "17862...ZF Share price index (Share prices)";
 For Italy: series "13662...ZF Share price index (Share prices)";
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 For Netherlands: series "13862...ZF Share price index (Share prices:General)";
 For Norway: series "14262...ZF Share price index (Share prices: Industrial (2000=100))";
 For Spain: series "18462...ZF Share price index (Share prices)"; and
 For Sweden: series "14462...ZF Share price index (Share prices)".
Housing Price Index
The data on country-level housing prices comes from di¤erent sources.
 For Belgium: Price index of existing and new dwellings; Quarterly data 1980:1-2006:4 (Source
BIS); Annual data 1970-1979 (Source: BIS) interpolated based on the Chow-Lin procedure
using a construction cost index (Source: BIS) as reference series.
 For Denmark: Price index of new and existing houses, Good & poor condition; Quarterly
data 1971:1-2006:4 (Source: ECB).
 For Finland: Price index of new and existing dwellings; Quarterly data 1978:1-2006:4 (Source:
BIS); Annual data 1970-1977 (Source: BIS) interpolated based on the Chow-Lin procedure
using the rent CPI (Source: OECD MEI) as reference series.
 For France: Price index for existing dwellings; Quarterly data 1996:1-2006:4 (Source: ECB);
Price index for existing homes; Annual data 1970-1995 (Source: BIS) interpolated based
on the Chow-Lin procedure using for 1980:2-1995:4 a price index for existing ats in Paris
(Source: ECB) and for 1970:1- 1980:1 a cost index for new residential construction (source:
BIS) and the rent CPI (Source: OECD MEI) as reference series.
 For Germany: Prices of good quality existing dwellings in 125 cities (in 4 capital cities prior to
1975); Annual data 1970-2006 (Source: BIS) interpolated based on the Chow-Lin procedure
using a building cost index (Source: BIS) and the rent CPI (Source: OECD MEI) as reference
series..
 For Ireland: Second hand house prices (from 1978) and new house prices (prior to 1978);
Quarterly data 1975:1-2006:4 (Source: Irish Department of the Environment); New house
prices; Annual data 1970-1974 (Source: ECB) interpolated based on the Chow-Lin procedure
using the rent CPI (Source: OECD MEI) as reference series.
 For Italy: Price index new and existing dwellings; Semi-annual data (Source: ECB) interpo-
lated based on the Chow-Lin procedure using a construction cost index (Source: BIS) and
the rent CPI (Source: OECD MEI) as reference series.
 For Netherlands: Price index for one-family houses and existing ats; Quarterly data 1970:1-
2006:4 (Source: BIS).
 For Norway: Registered purchase price of all dwellings; Quarterly data 1970:1-2006:4 (Source:
BIS)
 For Spain: Price index of new and existing dwellings; Quarterly data 1987:1-2006:4 (Source:
BIS); Madrid house prices; Annual data 1971-1986 (Source: BIS) interpolated based on the
Chow-Lin procedure using a construction cost index (Source: OECD MEI) and the rent CPI
(Source: OECD MEI) as reference series.
 For Sweden: Price Index of owner occupied new and existing dwellings; Quarterly data 1970:1-
2006:4 (Source: BIS).
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A.2 US Data
GDP
The source is Bureau of Economic Analysis, NIPA Table 1.1.5, line 1. Data for GDP are
quarterly, seasonally adjusted , and comprise the period 1947:1-2008:4.
Price Deator
All variables were deated by the CPI, All items less food, shelter, and energy (U.S. city average,
1982-1984=100) ("CUSR0000SA0L12E"). Data are quarterly (computed from monthly series by
using end-of-period values), seasonally adjusted , and comprise the period 1967:1-2008:4. The
source is the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Monetary Aggregate
Monetary Aggregate corresponds to M2. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted , and com-
prise the period 1960:1-2008:4. The sources are the OECD, Main Economic Indicators (series
"USA.MABMM201.STSA") and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Release
H6.
Short-Run Interest Rate
Short-Run Interest Rate is dened as the Federal Funds e¤ective rate. Data are quarterly
(computed from monthly series by using the compounded rate), and comprise, respectively, the
periods 1957:2-2008:4. The source is the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Release
H15 (series "RIFSPFF_N.M" and "RIFSGFSM03_N.M").
Producer Price Indexes
Producer Price Indexes include: (a) the producersprice index, Materials and components for
construction (1982=100) (series "WPUSOP2200"); (b) the producersprice index, All commodities
(1982=100) (series "WPU00000000"); (c) the producers price index, Crude materials (stage of
processing), (1982=100) (series "WPUSOP1000"); (d) the producers price index, Intermediate
materials, supplies and components (1982=100) (series "WPUSOP2000"). Data are quarterly
(computed from monthly series by using end-of-period values), and comprise the period 1947:1-
2008:4. All series are seasonally adjusted using Census X12 ARIMA. The source is the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
Unemployment Rate
Unemployment rate is dened as the civilian unemployment rate (16 and over) (series "LNS14000000").
Data are quarterly (computed from monthly series by using end-of-period values), seasonally ad-
justed and comprise the period 1948:1-2008:4. The source is the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current
Population Survey.
Aggregate wealth
Aggregate wealth is dened as the net worth of households and nonprot organizations. Data
are quarterly, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate, measured in billions of dollars (2000 prices),
in per capita terms and expressed in the logarithmic form. Series comprises the period 1952:2-
2008:4. The source of information is Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds
Accounts, Table B.100, line 41 (series FL152090005.Q).
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Financial wealth
Financial wealth is dened as the sum of nancial assets (deposits, credit market instruments,
corporate equities, mutual fund shares, security credit, life insurance reserves, pension fund re-
serves, equity in noncorporate business, and miscellaneous assets - line 8 of Table B.100 - series
FL154090005.Q) minus nancial liabilities (credit market instruments excluding home mortgages,
security credit, trade payables, and deferred and unpaid life insurance premiums - line 30 of Table
B.100 - series FL154190005.Q). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate, measured
in billions of dollars (2000 prices), in per capita terms and expressed in the logarithmic form. Series
comprises the period 1952:2-2008:4. The source of information is Board of Governors of Federal
Reserve System, Flow of Funds Accounts, Table B.100.
Housing wealth
Housing wealth (or home equity) is dened as the value of real estate held by households (line
4 of Table B.100 - series FL155035015.Q) minus home mortgages (line 32 of Table B.100 - series
FL153165105.Q). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate, measured in billions of
dollars (2000 prices), in per capita terms and expressed in the logarithmic form. Series comprises
the period 1952:2-2008:4. The source of information is Board of Governors of Federal Reserve
System, Flow of Funds Accounts, Table B.100.
Stock Market Index
Stock Market Index corresponds to S&P 500 Composite Price Index (close price adjusted for
dividends and splits). Data are quarterly (computed from monthly series by using end-of-period
values), and comprise the period 1950:1-2008:4.
Housing Price Index
Housing prices are measured using two sources: (a) the Price Index of New One-Family Houses
sold including the Value of Lot provided by the U.S. Census, an index based on houses sold in 1996,
available for the period 1963:1-2008:4; and (b) the House Price Index computed by the O¢ ce of
Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), available for the period 1975:1-2008:4. Data are
quarterly, seasonally adjusted.
Other Housing Market Indicators are provided by the U.S. Census. We use the Median Sales
Price of New Homes Sold including land and the New Privately Owned Housing Units Started.
The data for the Median Sales Price of New Homes Sold including land are quarterly, seasonally
adjusted using Census X12 ARIMA, and comprise the period 1963:1-2008:4. The data for the
New Privately Owned Housing Units Started are quarterly (computed by the sum of corresponding
monthly values), seasonally adjusted and comprise the period 1959:1-2008:4.
Exchange rate
Exchange Rate corresponds to real e¤ective exchange rate (series RNUS). Data are quarterly
(computed from monthly series by using end-of-period values). The series comprises the period
1964:1-2008:4 and the source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
A.3 UK Data
GDP
The source is O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS), series "YBHA". Data for GDP are quarterly,
seasonally adjusted , and comprise the period 1955:1-2008:4.
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Price Deator
All variables were deated by the GDP deator (series "YBGB"). Data are quarterly, seasonally
adjusted, and comprise the period 1955:1-2008:4. The source is the O¢ ce for National Statistics.
Monetary Aggregate
Monetary Aggregate corresponds toM4. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted , and comprise
the period 1963:2-2008:4. The source is the O¢ ce for National Statistics, series "AUYN".
Short-Run Interest Rate
Short-Run Interest Rate is dened as the 3-month Treasury Bill rate. Data are quarterly
(computed from monthly series by using the compounded rate), and comprise the period 1963:2-
2008:4. The source is the Datastream, series "UK3MTHINE".
Producer Price Index
Producer Price Indexes include the producersprice index, Input prices (materials and fuel)
(series "RNNK"). Data are quarterly (computed from monthly series by using end-of-period values),
and comprise the period 1974:1-2008:4. All series are seasonally adjusted using Census X12 ARIMA.
The source is the O¢ ce for National Statistics.
Unemployment Rate
Unemployment rate is dened as the civilian unemployment rate (16 and over) (series "MGSX").
Data are quarterly (computed from monthly series by using end-of-period values), seasonally ad-
justed and comprise the period 1971:1-2008:4. The source is the O¢ ce for National Statistics.
Aggregate wealth
Aggregate wealth is dened as the net worth of households and nonprot organizations, this
is, the sum of nancial wealth and housing wealth. Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted at an
annual rate, measured in millions of pounds (2001 prices), in per capita terms and expressed in
the logarithmic form. Series comprises the period 1975:1-2008:4. The sources of information are:
Fernandez-Corugedo et al. (2007) - provided by the O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS) -, for the
period 1975:1-1986:4; and the O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS), for the period 1987:1-2008:4.
Financial wealth
Financial wealth is dened as the net nancial wealth of households and nonprot organizations
(NZEA). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate, measured in millions of pounds
(2001 prices), in per capita terms and expressed in the logarithmic form. Series comprises the period
1970:1-2008:4. The sources of information are: Fernandez-Corugedo et al. (2007) - provided by
the O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS) -, for the period 1970:1-1986:4; and the O¢ ce for National
Statistics (ONS), for the period 1987:1-2008:4.
Housing wealth
Housing wealth is dened as the housing wealth of households and nonprot organizations and
is computed as the sum of tangible assets in the form of residential buildings adjusted by changes in
house prices (CGRI), the dwellings (of private sector) of gross xed capital formation (GGAG) and
Council house sales (CTCS). Data are quarterly, seasonally adjusted at an annual rate, measured in
millions of pounds (2001 prices), in per capita terms and expressed in the logarithmic form. Series
comprises the period 1975:1-2008:4. The sources of information are: Fernandez-Corugedo et al.
(2007) - provided by the O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS) -, for the period 1975:1-1986:4; and
the O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS), for the period 1987:1-2008:4. For data on house prices,
the sources of information are: O¢ ce of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM), Halifax Plc and the
Nationwide Building Society.
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Stock Market Index
Stock Market Index corresponds to FTSE-All shares Index. Data are quarterly (computed from
monthly series by using end-of-period values), and comprise the period 1975:1-2008:4.
Housing Price Index
Housing Price Index corresponds to Nationwide: All Houses Price Index. Data are quarterly,
seasonally adjusted using Census X12 ARIMA, and comprise the period 1955:1-2008:4.
Exchange rate
Exchange Rate corresponds to real e¤ective exchange rate (series RNGB). Data are quarterly
(computed from monthly series by using end-of-period values). The series comprises the period
1964:1-2008:4 and the source is the Bank for International Settlements (BIS).
B A Mixed Monte Carlo Importance Sampling Algorithm for
Drawing from the Posterior Distribution of the Impulse-Response
Function
To be able to identify the structural monetary shocks, one needs at least (n  1)n=2 linearly
independent restrictions. With enough restrictions in the  0 matrix and no restrictions in the
matrix of coe¢ cients on the lagged variables, the estimation of the model is numerically simple
since the log-likelihood will be
l (B; a; 0) =  T
2
+ log j 0j   1
2
trace

S (B; a)  00 0

(B.1)
where S (B; a) =
TX
t=1
(B (L)Xt   a) (B (L)Xt   a)0
and the maximum-likelihood estimator of B and a can be found simply doing OLS equation-
by-equation regardless of the value of  0: Integrating l (B; a; 0) (or the posterior with conjugate
priors) with respect to (B; a) the marginal log probability density function of  0 is proportional to
 T   k
2
log (2) + (T   k) log j 0j   1
2
trace
h
S

B^OLS ; a^OLS

 00 0
i
: (B.2)
In the S-VAR setting considered, the impulse-response functions are given by
B (L) 1   10 : (B.3)
This implies that to assess posterior uncertainty regarding the impulse-response function one needs
joint draws for both B (L) and  0.
Since equation (B.2) is not in the form of any standard probability density function one cannot
draw directly from  0 to make inference. Nevertheless, if one takes a second order expansion
of equation (B.2) around its peak one gets the usual Gaussian approximation to the asymptotic
distribution of the elements in  0. Since this is not the true form of the posterior probability
density function, one cannot use it directly to produce a Monte Carlo sample. A possible approach
is importance sampling, in which one draws from the Gaussian approximation, but weigh the draws
by the ratio of (B.2) to the probability density function from which one draws. The weighted sample
cumulative density function then approximates the cumulative density function corresponding to
(B.2).
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Note also that the distribution of B (L) ; given  0, is the usual normal distribution
vec (B (L)) j 0  N

vec

B^OLS

;  10
 
  10
0 
  X 0X 1 : (B.4)
So one can take joint draws using the following simple algorithm: (i) draw  0 using (B.2); and
(ii) draw vec (B (L)) using equation (B.4). Condence bands for the impulse-response function are
then constructed from the weighted percentiles of the Monte Carlo sample where the weights are
computed by importance sampling.
Denote with H^ the numerical Hessian from the minimization routine at the point estimate and
 ^0 the maximum-likelihood estimator. The algorithm used to draw the condence bands from the
posterior distribution is the following:
1. Check that all the coe¢ cients on the main diagonal of  ^0 are positive. If they are not, ip
the sign of the rows that have a negative coe¢ cient on the main diagonal [that is, our point
estimates are normalized to have positive elements on the main diagonal).
2. Set i = 0.
3. Drawn vech

~ 0

from a normal N

vech

 ^0

; V^

; where V^ = H^ 1 and vech (:) vectorizes
the unconstrained elements of a matrix. That is, this step draws from the asymptotic dis-
tribution of  0. In order to handle draws in which some of the diagonal elements of ~ 0 are
not positive, we follow the procedure where the draw is rejected (and one goes back to 2 and
takes another draw) if some of the diagonal entries of ~ 0 are not positive.
4. Compute and store the importance sampling weight
mi = exp
2664
T log
det~ 0  12 traceS B^OLS ; a^OLS ~ 00~ 0
  log
V^   12 + :5vech~ 0  vech ^00 V^  1 vech~ 0  vech ^0
 SCFT
3775
(B.5)
where SCFT is a scale factor that prevents overow/underow [a good choice for it is normally
the value of the likelihood at its peak).
5. Draw vec

~B (L)

from a normal N

vec

B^OLS

; ~  10

~  10
0 
 (X 0X) 1 to get a draw for
~B (L).
6. Compute the impulse-response function and store it in a multidimensional array.
7. If i < #draws; set i = i+ 1 and go back to 3.
The stored draws of the impulse-response function, jointly with the importance sampling weights,
are used to construct condence bands from their percentiles. Moreover, the draws of ~ 0 are stored
to construct posterior condence interval for these parameters from the posterior (weighted) quan-
tiles.
Normalized weights that sum up to 1 are simply constructed as:
wi =
miP#draws
i mi
: (B.6)
When the number of draws is su¢ ciently large for the procedure outlined above to deliver accurate
inference, the plot of the normalized weights should ideally show that none of them is too far from
zero that is, one single draw should not receive 90% of the weight.
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Table 4: Nonlinear monetary rule: Reaction to wealth composition - Euro Area (1980:1-2007:4).
Part (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Linear ( )
pt  0:532  0:674 1:709 1:281 1:236 1:175
[0:749] [0:556] [0:310] [0:066] [0:087] [0:067]
yt 0:567
 0:422 0:347 0:464 0:937 0:715 0:4102 0:605
[0:285] [0:168] [0:234] [0:147] [0:193] [0:132] [0:147] [0:142]
mt  0:237  0:296  0:064  0:288
[0:095] [0:088] [0:075] [0:079]
wt  0:263  0:153
[0:075] [0:044]
fwt 0:056
 0:040 0:060
[0:017] [0:014] [0:017]
hwt  0:197  0:212  0:240
[0:030] [0:027] [0:028]
Nonlinear (!)
pt 1:442
 0:908 1:914 1:258  0:482
[0:749] [0:134] [0:562] [0:150] [0:333]
yt  0:241 0:052  0:415
[0:373] [0:330] [0:270]
mt 0:950
 1:1495 0:818 0:845 0:883 0:626
[0:245] [0:221] [0:195] [0:086] [0:076] [0:077]
wt 0:181

[0:115]
fwt  0:125  0:111  0:096
[0:026] [0:024] [0:022]
hwt 0:112
 0:105 0:228
[0:048] [0:043] [0:037]
 10:25 11:25 15:01 15:63 39:79 73:29 78:61 32:67
c 2:534 2:586 2:645 2:701 2:893 2:830 2:856 2:800
[0:093] [0:076] [0:062] [0:058] [0:001] [0:182] [0:428] [0:056]
( + !)
mt 0:854
 0:595
[0:096] [0:073]
fwt  0:071  0:036
[0:015] [0:020]
hwt  0:107  0:011
[0:029] [0:028]
Obs. 105 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
Adj.R2 0:867 0:866 0:906 0:902 0:941 0:938 0:905 0:925
SBIC 0:885 0:806 0:720 0:622 0:338 0:213 0:590 0:308
H01 0:000 0:006 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
H02 0:000 0:543 0:011 0:001 0:160 0:005 0:187 0:009
H03 0:639 0:679 0:000 0:056 0:001 0:000 0:001 0:000
H04 0:001 0:008 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Model LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1
st = pt pt pt pt pt pt pt pt
Notes:  statistically signicant at 10% level;  at 5% level;  at 1% level. All variables are in log di¤erences.
Standard errors are in square brackets. Adj.R2 is the adjusted R2 and SBIC is the Schwarz Bayesian Information
Criterion. H01 reports the p-value of the linearity test; H02 to H04 report the p-value of the tests used to choose the
preferred model.
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Table 5: Nonlinear monetary rule: Reaction to wealth composition - US (1967:2-2008:4).
Part (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Linear ( )
pt 0:668
 1:022 1:024 1:028 1:086 1:036 1:029 1:031
[0:144] [0:081] [0:085] [0:082] [0:090] [0:084] [0:082] [0:084]
yt  1:673 0:755 0:696 0:736 0:649 0:733 0:742 0:748
[0:581] [0:079] [0:089] [0:083] [0:092] [0:082] [0:082] [0:079]
mt 0:002 0:023 0:013
[0:050] [0:050] [0:048]
wt 0:0193 0:021
[0:030] [0:029]
fwt 0:027 0:019 0:021
[0:026] [0:025] [0:026]
hwt  0:004
[0:019]
Nonlinear (!)
pt 0:710
  0:544 0:379
[0:177] [1:231] [0:994]
yt 1:996
 0:532 0:618
[0:578] [0:409] [0:352]
mt 1:334
 1:101 1:288 0:762 1:311
[0:235] [0:671] [0:247] [0:195] [0:244]
wt  0:033
[0:245]
fwt  0:365
[0:221]
hwt 0:638
 0:362 0:370
[0:104] [0:062] [0:061]
 3:81 50:54 58:45 47:28 48:95 47:66 46:79 49:17
c  1:042 7:602 7:802 7:518 6:875 7:800 7:796 7:800
[0:253] [0:100] [0:350] [2:595] [1:165] [0:302] [0:768] [0:344]
( + !)
pt 1:377

[0:066]
yt 0:323

[0:084]
Obs. 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 164
Adj.R2 0:763 0:753 0:759 0:754 0:776 0:762 0:754 0:761
SBIC 1:229 1:239 1:369 1:267 1:357 1:263 1:265 1:236
H01 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
H02 0:001 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:001 0:000 0:000 0:000
H03 0:003 0:012 0:001 0:019 0:002 0:005 0:005 0:002
H04 0:124 0:000 0:123 0:000 0:004 0:000 0:000 0:000
Model LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1
st = yt pt pt pt pt pt pt pt
Notes:  statistically signicant at 10% level;  at 5% level;  at 1% level. All variables are in log di¤erences.
Standard errors are in square brackets. Adj.R2 is the adjusted R2 and SBIC is the Schwarz Bayesian Information
Criterion. H01 reports the p-value of the linearity test; H02 to H04 report the p-value of the tests used to choose the
preferred model.
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Table 6: Nonlinear monetary rule: Reaction to wealth composition - UK (1975:1-2007:4).
Part (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Linear ( )
pt 0:688
 0:156 0:068 0:283 0:191 0:269 0:130 0:303
[0:302] [0:059] [0:389] [0:078] [0:379] [0:075] [0:085] [0:079]
yt  0:085  0:565  0:283
[0:202] [0:089] [0:418]
mt 0:081 0:098
 0:078 0:126 0:113 0:119
[0:081] [0:546] [0:079] [0:052] [0:054] [0:054]
wt 0:109 0:086

[0:045] [0:042]
fwt 0:063
 0:059 0:065
[0:022] [0:021] [0:023]
hwt 0:008  0:003  0:003
[0:042] [0:001] [0:001]
Nonlinear (!)
pt  0:536 0:263 0:141
[0:302] [0:402] [0:390]
yt 0:583
 0:431 0:717 0:183 0:381 0:142 0:165 0:176
[0:256] [0:138] [0:425] [0:106] [0:443] [0:085] [0:144] [0:099]
mt 0:061 0:112
[0:112] [0:110]
wt  0:113  0:089
[0:045] [0:042]
fwt  0:108  0:101  0:110
[0:027] [0:025] [0:029]
hwt  0:011
[0:042]
 11:48 7:78 19:39 25:33 29:86 31:40 9:87 26:22
c 5:484 4:787 4:084 4:095 4:090 4:086 4:440 4:095
[0:497] [0:297] [0:941] [0:866] [1:394] [1:901] [0:306] [0:914]
( + !)
wt  0:003
[0:046]
fwt  0:042  0:045
[0:021] [0:024]
Obs. 201 201 132 132 132 132 132 132
Adj.R2 0:590 0:586 0:729 0:723 0:750 0:746 0:736 0:713
SBIC 1:725 1:683 1:651 1:562 1:642 1:509 1:514 1:559
H01 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
H02 0:864 0:000 0:001 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:020 0:000
H03 0:123 0:001 0:005 0:003 0:000 0:001 0:001 0:004
H04 0:000 0:000 0:003 0:000 0:002 0:000 0:000 0:000
Model LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1
st = pt pt pt pt pt pt pt pt
Notes:  statistically signicant at 10% level;  at 5% level;  at 1% level. All variables are in log di¤erences.
Standard errors are in square brackets. Adj.R2 is the adjusted R2 and SBIC is the Schwarz Bayesian Information
Criterion. H01 reports the p-value of the linearity test; H02 to H04 report the p-value of the tests used to choose the
preferred model.
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Table 7: Nonlinear rule: Reaction to wealth composition - Euro Area, US and UK (1980:1-2007:4).
Part (1-EA) (2-EA) (3-US) (4-US) (5-UK) (6-UK)
Linear ( )
pt 1:281
 2:240 2:286
[0:066] [0:130] [0:107]
yt 0:464
 0:715 0:710 0:660  0:609  0:338
[0:147] [0:132] [0:086] [0:079] [0:271] [0:255]
mt  0:296 0:175 0:335 0:103 0:107
[0:088] [0:094] [0:041] [0:047] [0:046]
wt  0:153 0:036 0:107
[0:044] [0:027] [0:032]
fwt 0:040
 0:048 0:060
[0:014] [0:017] [0:015]
hwt  0:212  0:087
[0:027] [0:019]
Nonlinear (!)
pt 1:258
 0:967 0:931
[0:151] [0:236] [0:235]
yt 0:818
 0:635
[0:325] [0:329]
mt 1:150
 0:845 0:268
[0:221] [0:086] [0:117]
wt  0:193
[0:048]
fwt  0:111  0:084
[0:024] [0:029]
hwt 0:105
 0:162  0:070
[0:043] [0:036] [0:033]
 15:63 73:29 15:18 12:38 24:12 27:86
c 2:701 2:830 3:024 3:116 3:940 3:945
[0:058] [0:182] [0:126] [0:235] [1:625] [0:605]
( + !)
yt 0:209 0:298
[0:275] [0:256]
mt 0:854
 0:442
[0:096] [0:078]
wt  0:086
[0:033]
fwt  0:071  0:024
[0:015] [0:154]
hwt  0:107 0:083
[0:029] [0:019]
Obs. 105 105 105 105 102 102
Adj.R2 0:902 0:938 0:884 0:909 0:832 0:840
SBIC 0:622 0:213 0:346 0:143 0:990 0:986
H01 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:001 0:000
H02 0:001 0:005 0:664 0:224 0:139 0:085
H03 0:056 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:008 0:003
H04 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:006 0:000
Model LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1
st = pt pt pt pt pt pt
Notes:  statistically signicant at 10% level;  at 5% level;  at 1% level. All variables are in log
di¤erences. Standard errors are in square brackets. Adj.R2 is the adjusted R2 and SBIC is the Schwarz
Bayesian Information Criterion. H01 reports the p-value of the linearity test; H02 to H04 report the p-value
of the tests used to choose the preferred model.
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Table 8: Linear monetary rule: Reaction to asset prices - Euro Area, US and UK.
Equation it mt spt hpt
Evidence from the Euro Area
(1) 113:239
[71:242; 155:420]
it   186:901
[ 213:232;  146:629]
mt   11:862
[ 14:259;  9:613]
spt
(2) 0:903
[0:470; 1:361]
it   267:520
[ 301:071;  234:726]
mt + 11:268
[8:495; 13:917]
spt + 44:400
[41:172; 61:653]
hpt
Evidence from the US
(3) 16:833
[ 2:795; 38:864]
it   161:395
[ 175:209;  151:526]
mt + 7:267
[5:738; 8:414]
spt
(4) 47:477
[1:105; 72:695]
it   13:732
[ 28:213;  0:991]
mt + 13:240
[12:450; 14:068]
spt   5:333
[ 10:140;  4:740]
hpt
Evidence from the UK
(5)   0:391
[ 0:452;  0:337]
it + 0:083
[0:029; 0:136]
mt   12:310
[ 12:675;  11:976]
spt
(6)   0:361
[ 0:414;  0:309]
it   0:005
[ 0:067; 0:054]
mt   12:260
[ 12:604;  11:924]
spt + 11:243
[8:249; 14:490]
hpt
Note: Median estimates and 68% probability intervals computed using a Monte Carlo Importance Sampling
algorithm.
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Table 9: Nonlinear rule: Reaction to asset prices - Euro Area, US and UK.
Part (1-EA) (2-EA) (3-US) (4-US) (5-US) (6-UK) (7-UK) (8-UK)
Linear ( )
pt 0:519 1:093
 1:159 2:071 1:245 1:363
[0:480] [0:115] [0:113] [0:136] [0:091] [0:088]
yt 0:576
 0:405 0:900 0:863 0:624 0:261 0:459 0:185
[0:213] [0:134] [0:099] [0:102] [0:074] [0:173] [0:130] [0:142]
mt  0:091 0:111 0:095 0:133 0:121
[0:089] [0:046] [0:046] [0:053] [0:043]
spt  0:009  0:003 0:019 0:013 0:014 0:020 0:028 0:017
[0:011] [0:059] [0:008] [0:007] 0:006 [0:011] [0:011] [0:009]
hpt  0:593  0:643  0:123  0:110  0:285  0:092  0:081  0:088
[0:093] [0:074] [0:043] [0:046] [0:047] [0:024] [0:022] [0:020]
cpt 0:023
 0:026  0:053  0:054  0:054  0:105
[0:009] [0:006] [0:038] [0:021] [0:022] [0:022]
Nonlinear (!)
pt 0:548 1:044
 0:520 0:034 1:024
[0:466] [0:132] [0:994] [0:240] [0:215]
yt  0:287 1:074 1:032  0:119
[0:313] [0:243] [0:209] [0:453]
mt 0:472
 0:348  1:012 0:481 0:953 1:240
[0:282] [0:205] [0:452] [0:051] [0:235] [0:089]
spt  0:018  0:019  0:061  0:069
[0:015] [0:025] [0:018] [0:018]
hpt 0:583
 0:622  1:006  0:729 0:254 0:134
[0:115] [0:096] [0:222] [0:121] [0:082] [0:117]
cpt  0:001  0:213  0:208 0:166 0:404 0:456 0:093
[0:015] [0:147] [0:077] [0:064] [0:073] [0:052] [0:041]
 10:26 11:18 4:96 9:74 7:50 8:10 5:63 28:33
c 2:626 2:596 6:512 5:714 2:840 4:586 4:380 3:946
[0:067] [0:057] [0:313] [0:301] [0:0831] [0:698] [0:431] [0:608]
( + !)
yt 1:894

[0:215]
spt  0:041
[0:015]
hpt  0:021  0:839  0:031
[0:073] [0:400] [0:047]
cpt 0:403
  0:012
[0:031] [0:021]
Obs. 105 105 164 164 105 129 129 102
Adj.R2 0:938 0:935 0:837 0:816 0:922 0:846 0:837 0:866
SBIC 0:484 0:299 1:103 1:102 0:343 1:231 1:141 0:813
H01 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
H02 0:019 0:001 0:006 0:000 0:030 0:002 0:000 0:002
H03 0:000 0:016 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:007
H04 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000 0:000
Model LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1 LSTR1
st = pt pt pt pt pt pt pt pt
Notes:  statistically signicant at 10% level;  at 5% level;  at 1% level. All variables are in log di¤erences. Standard
errors are in square brackets. Adj.R2 is the adjusted R2 and SBIC is the Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion. H01
reports the p-value of the linearity test; H02 to H04 report the p-value of the tests used to choose the preferred model.
The results presented in columns 5 and 8 were obtained from regressions for the same time period considered for the
Euro Area: 1980:1-2007:4.
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